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D.D. Dawley et al. / Journal of Management 2002 28(5) organizations is the Chapter 11 reorganization plan (11 U.S.C. § SEC 1306(b) of the Federal Bankruptcy Code). Since this modified reorganization plan began in 1978, the annual number of publicly traded companies filing Chapter 11 has doubled (New Generation Research, 1998) . The purpose of Chapter 11 reorganization is to provide firms with an alternative to liquidation in order to help protect the long-term interests of a broad range of stakeholders, creditors included. However, if a firm exits Chapter 11 without achieving financial recovery, it is questionable that this goal has been achieved.
Research suggests that the enactment of Chapter 11 reorganization has done more harm than good to stakeholders of Chapter 11-filing firms. For example, Bradley and Rosenzweig (1992) found that while stockholders of Chapter 11-filing firms lost half of their investment before the Act, stockholders lost nearly all of their investment after the Act. This may be due to the rising direct costs of bankruptcy reorganizations (e.g., attorney's fees, loss from disrupted operations), which frequently approach 20% of the firm's total liabilities (Moulton & Thomas, 1993) . Or, it may be due to the indirect and nonfinancial costs of bankruptcy reorganizations. Indirect costs, such as higher interest rates for lines of credit, reduced bargaining power with suppliers, and difficulty in entering into long-term commitments (e.g., joint ventures, strategic alliances), may exceed the direct costs (Moulton & Thomas, 1993) . And the nonfinancial costs are equally significant, including the stigma of being associated with a bankrupt firm (Sutton & Callahan, 1987) , managerial displacement (Gilson, 1989) , and the general loss of employment (Lynn & Neyland, 1992) . Particularly troublesome may be the ill effects that accrue to the displaced worker (Victor & Stephens, 1994) .
Given the track record of firms filing for Chapter 11 reorganization, it is critical for strategy and management scholars to help stakeholders of distressed firms understand the factors that make financial recovery more likely to occur. Ideally, it would seem helpful to identify the types of strategic changes that should be incorporated into reorganization plans depending on the challenges facing particular firms. It would also seem useful to identify situations where popularly prescribed reorganization plans are unlikely to help firms' recovery efforts. In these situations, more novel remedies may be needed. Or, it may be in the interest of creditors and other stakeholders to push for the sale of the firm instead of accepting the likelihood of continued sub-par performance and the associated financial and nonfinancial costs.
Most of the previous research on bankruptcy reorganizations has sought to identify how and why firms get into such predicaments (cf., Altman, Haldeman & Narayan, 1977; Bradley & Rosenzweig, 1992; Daily & Dalton, 1994a , 1994b Gilson, 1990; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1992) . The intent of the work has been to identify the antecedents to financial problems so that they can be prevented. However, minimal research has examined the fate of firms once bankruptcy has been declared (see Hotchkiss, 1995; Moulton & Thomas, 1993 for notable exceptions). Additionally, no study has explicitly examined the utility of different strategic initiatives in boosting firms' odds of post-bankruptcy performance improvements.
Prior research on corporate turnarounds, however, offers plausible clues about the strategic initiatives likely to improve post-bankruptcy performance. Whereas corporate turnarounds are a more general and multi-faceted phenomenon than bankruptcy reorganizations, bankruptcy may be the ultimate turnaround challenge. Prior work on turnarounds rather consistently suggests the utility of retrenchment or refocusing in bolstering turnaround success in a variety of settings (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bibeault, 1982; Hall, 1980; Hambrick D.D. Dawley et al. / Journal of Management 2002 28(5) 695-717 697 & Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) . The extent to which and how refocusing, or the reduction in the scope of a firm's business activities, helps the turnaround of bankrupt firms is both empirically unexplored and theoretically unspecified, however.
The theoretical framework of Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) holds promise in usefully delineating situations where refocusing strategies of bankrupt firms may prove beneficial. The framework highlights the interplay between firm power and capabilities and environmental constraints in determining both the likelihood and merits of different strategic initiatives. These issues of intentional restructuring of firm assets and capabilities in the face of environmental selection pressures lie at the heart of the problem confronting managers of bankrupt firms (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) . The approach taken here, building on the Hrebiniak and Joyce framework, is consistent with other recent work that has identified the relative success of various strategic initiatives in an ecologically competitive and delimiting context (e.g., Barnett, 1997; Baum, Li & Usher, 2000; Baum & Singh, 1994; Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar & Cotterill, 2001) .
The purpose of this study is to identify situations more and less conducive to bankruptcy reorganization success, in general, and through corporate refocusing, or the reduction in scope of a firm's business activities, in particular. Toward these goals, we draw on Hrebiniak and Joyce's (1985) and Marlin, Lamont and Hoffman's (1994) work on choice situations (marked by varying levels of strategic choice and environmental constraint) to explain when bankruptcy reorganizations are most likely to be associated with post-reorganization performance gains, in general. We also explain when and how the performance effects of refocusing initiatives among bankrupt firms are contingent on choice situation. In so doing, we integrate both the bankruptcy and turnaround literatures and extend them theoretically by specifying boundary conditions under which bankruptcy turnarounds relying on refocusing are performance enhancing. We also empirically test these assertions. The importance of this study rests on the increasing frequency and costs of Chapter 11 reorganizations and our rather limited understanding of what managers and other stakeholders of these firms should do once they find themselves in such predicaments. This paper is organized as follows. First, Hrebiniak and Joyce's (1985) theoretical framework is reviewed. Next, paralleling the tack of Marlin et al. (1994) in applying the framework to more general competitive contexts, the theory is extended to post-bankruptcy performance, where performance differences between choice situations, and performance differences between strategies within choice situations for bankrupt firms are hypothesized. Methods used in the study and results from the study are then reported. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the study's findings for theory, practice, and future research.
Theory and Hypotheses
Where early research in strategy and organizational ecology accentuated the differences between the two theoretical perspectives (cf., Aldrich, 1979; Astley & Van de Ven, 1983; Child, 1972; Hannan & Freeman, 1977) , following the lead of Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) , more recent work has typically explored the intersections of the two literatures and their complementarities (Baum, 1996; Lubatkin et al., 2001; McKelvey & Baum, 1999 Dawley et al. / Journal of Management 2002 28(5) example, early work in strategy and organizational ecology was characterized by divergent assumptions of effective adaptation, reflected in different research questions guiding their respective empirical efforts. Strategy scholars viewed organizational change as a managerially determined process enacted in a manageable external environment (Child, 1972) . Early work (e.g., Miles & Snow, 1978; Schendel & Hofer, 1979) , therefore, focused on identifying strategy's role in explaining adaptation to environmental change (Lubatkin et al., 2001) . In contrast, early ecology theorists viewed organizational change as an environmentally determined process where top management had few strategic options and little or no effect on a firm's success or survival (Aldrich, 1979; Hannan & Freeman, 1977) . From this position, early ecological research examined the effects of variables beyond the control of managers (like density dependence, resource niche width, and time of founding) on the survival prospects of organizations (Baum, 1996) . In their landmark synthesis of these two apparently conflicting views, Hrebiniak and Joyce (1985) posited an orthogonal relationship between managerial choice and environmental constraint, where the early strategy and ecological archetypical views captured only two of four possible choice situations. Situations were also described in which management and environment were both weak or powerful, highlighting the importance of considering the interactions between firm attributes and initiatives and ecological constraints. Further reconciling the previously conflicting views of organizational change, Hrebiniak and Joyce posited that choice situation influences the number and form of available and effective strategic options.
More recent strategy-organizational ecology literature corroborates Hrebiniak and Joyce's tenet that strategic choice and ecological processes together determine the fate of organizations (Barnett, 1997; Barnett & Burgelman, 1996; Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Baum, Li & Usher, 2000; Baum & Singh, 1994; Burgelman, 1991 Burgelman, , 1994 Burgelman, , 1996 Chang, 1996; Lewin & Volberda, 1999; Lubatkin et al., 2001; Marlin et al., 1994) . What differentiates this growing body of literature from earlier work is its focus on managerially controllable organization-level attributes as determinants of relative organizational success within a population of ecologically competitive firms. For example, some of the factors linked to competitive viability include organizational learning (Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Barnett, Mischke & Ocasio, 2000) , knowledge acquisition and restructuring (Chang, 1996) , corporate entrepreneurship (Burgelman, 1996) , and strategy (Baum & Singh, 1994; Marlin et al., 1994) . This collective research suggests that the interplay between strategic choice and environmental context determines firm performance. We build on this work below by using Hrebiniak and Joyce's (1985) framework as a theoretical foundation for examining post-bankruptcy performance and extending current thought regarding the effect of context and choice on post-bankruptcy performance.
Hrebiniak and Joyce's theoretical framework rests on several premises about organizationenvironment relationships. First, the relationship is characterized by interdependence. To some extent, both organization and environment are dependent on, and have power over, each other. Second, the interdependence between organization and environment is not a zero-sum relationship. Increased power of one party in the relationship does not necessarily reduce the power of the other. Relationships are possible where neither organization nor environment have much influence over each other, where one dominates the other, and where both are powerful. Third, the relationship is one of dynamic interaction. Actions taken by either party in the relationship affect the other, possibly altering the balance of power in the relationship. For example, organizations may exercise their influence or adopt strategies that increase their power over external elements-customers, suppliers, and competitors. Or, external elements may exert their influence in similar attempts to increase their power over an organization.
From these premises, Hrebiniak and Joyce developed a typology of organizationenvironment relationships, or choice situations. The level of strategic choice refers to the power of the organization over its environment, whereas the level of environmental constraint reflects the power of the environment over the organization. By dichotomizing the levels of strategic choice and environmental constraint, four choice situations are identified: minimum choice, differentiated choice, maximum choice, and incremental choice.
Between-Situation Post-Bankruptcy Performance Differences
Hrebiniak and Joyce's work implies that post-bankruptcy performance should be contingent upon the choice situation of the bankrupt firm. In general, one should expect the performance effects of strategic choice to be positive and the performance effects of environmental constraints to be negative (Lawless & Finch, 1989) , suggesting an ordinal relationship between choice situation and performance (Marlin et al., 1994) . That is, firms in maximum choice situations should outperform those firms in differentiated and incremental choice situations, which should outperform those firms in minimum choice situations. These predictions, depicted in Figure 1 , rest on considerable theoretical and empirical research in both strategy and organizational ecology, which we use to make similar predictions for bankrupt firms. Our rationale is very briefly amplified below.
Few would disagree with the position that the performance effects of greater strategic choice should generally be positive. This tenet lies at the heart of much strategy and recent Dawley et al. / Journal of Management 2002 28(5) organizational ecology theory. Strategy researchers (cf., Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Chen & MacMillan, 1992; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994; Porter, 1980) frequently draw on a substantial literature in economics (e.g., Bain, 1956; Baumol, Panzar & Willig, 1982; Mason, 1959; Stigler, 1964) to document that business firms with power over their environment will exploit their position and resource advantages to achieve financial gains. For example, larger rivals with dominant market positions typically shape industry competition by initiating the competitive moves to which smaller rivals must respond (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Grimm & Smith, 1997) .
Additionally, in an attempt to explain why some firms are more susceptible to selection pressures than others, work in organizational ecology also identifies sources and benefits of strategic choice for certain firms, typically large, powerful ones. For example, larger size confers legitimacy (Baum, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1977 , mass dependence (Barnett & Amburgey, 1990) , and niche overlap (Baum & Singh, 1994) advantages to firms that help them to better function and survive. Larger firms also typically have more slack than smaller firms (Hannan & Freeman, 1984) , which can protect the organization against selection pressures and function as a "transformational shield" when major organizational change may be required that would reset a firm's liability of newness clock (Baum, 1996) , as is typical for bankrupt firms attempting to reorganize from Chapter 11 protection. In short, selection pressures are mitigated by size and its frequent correlate, slack.
The negative performance effect of environmental constraints is also a central tenet of both strategy and organizational ecology theory. The importance attached to industry positioning among strategy scholars (e.g., Porter, 1980 ) is illustrative of this point and supported by considerable evidence documenting the role of industry membership (Chang & Singh, 2000; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Schmalensee, 1985) and positioning within industries (Chang & Singh, 2000; Ketchen et al., 1997; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Mehra, 1996) as determinants of firm performance. Additionally, for organizational ecologists, the performance and survival constraints imposed by the environment is a given. Environmental carrying capacity, competition density within resource niches, and the survival shocks of environmental discontinuities are all hallmarks of organizational ecology, with a rich empirical base of support (see Baum, 1996 , for a review).
Although the performance effects of strategic choice and environmental constraint are viewed as broadly applicable by Hrebiniak and Joyce and other strategy and organizational ecology scholars, they may be particularly telling performance determinants in the case of bankrupt firms. For example, organizational slack has been argued to be one of the most critical resources for implementing strategic change in turnaround situations (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Grinyer, Mayes & McKierman, 1988) , such as Chapter 11 protection. Similarly reflecting strategic choice, larger firms are better able than their smaller counterparts to endure sustained periods of pitiful performance due to the relatively greater number of external constituents dependent on the larger firm (Meyer & Zucker, 1989) . This time should prove extremely valuable to firms in bankruptcy reorganization. This may be why organizational size has been found positively associated with bankruptcy reorganization success (Moulton & Thomas, 1993) . Furthermore, since external jolts and impingements on performance are common causes of firms filing for Chapter 11 protection in the first place (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bibeault, 1982; New Generation Research, 1998; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) , those bankrupt firms facing extremely resource scarce and hostile contexts will undoubtedly face more daunting reorganization challenges than those bankrupt firms in more hospitable contexts. In fact, without at least some adequate level of strategic choice or environmental munificence, a bankrupt firm would have little basis for a successful reorganization plan.
Thus, in line with Hrebiniak and Joyce's theory, Marlin et al.'s (1994) assertions, the existing evidence about bankruptcy survival (e.g., Hotchkiss, 1995; Moulton & Thomas, 1993) , and the preponderance of current thought in strategy and organizational ecology, we specify the following for empirical confirmation.
Hypothesis 1: Bankrupt firms in maximum choice situations will have higher postbankruptcy performance than those in differentiated choice situations.
Hypothesis 2: Bankrupt firms in maximum choice situations will have higher postbankruptcy performance than those firms in incremental choice situations.
Hypothesis 3: Bankrupt firms in maximum choice situations will have higher postbankruptcy performance than those firms in minimum choice situations.
Hypothesis 4: Bankrupt firms in differentiated choice situations will have higher postbankruptcy performance than those firms in minimum choice situations.
Hypothesis 5: Bankrupt firms in incremental choice situations will have higher postbankruptcy performance than those firms in minimum choice situations.
Refocusing and Within-Situation Post-Bankruptcy Performance Differences
Given Hrebiniak and Joyce's emphasis on the dynamic, interactive nature of organizationenvironment relationships and empirical findings from Marlin et al. (1994) , it is equally consistent with their framework to expect refocusing-related performance differences within choice situations. Refocusing is the process of contraction through reducing levels of diversification and/or segment divestitures (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Markides, 1992) . This corporate strategy is an important one for bankrupt firms as it can improve their strategic choice by increasing their cash flow and slack resources (Bibeault, 1982; Hall, 1980; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) and strengthening a firm's stance relative to its competitors (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Lubatkin & Chatterjee, 1994) . Refocusing can also reduce the degree of environmental constraints confronting the bankrupt firm by redefining its environmental context (Chang & Singh, 2000; Ginsberg & Baum, 1994; McKelvey & Baum, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) , particularly when it involves the redeployment of firm assets around a more hospitable and tractable core business.
The expectation that there may be refocusing-related performance differences within choice situations follows from: (1) the fact that levels of strategic choice and environmental determinism are probably more accurately viewed as continuous rather than discrete variables; (2) the promise that refocusing can boost a firm's slack resources and alter the nature of the external constraints confronting the firm; and (3) the likelihood that strategic choice, determinism, and corporate strategy do not always change at the same rate, magnitude, or 702 D.D. Dawley et al. / Journal of Management 2002 28(5) time. Within any particular choice situation there will be some range of strategic choice and determinism, the values of which at the limit, or boundary, approach those of another choice situation. As organizations acquire (lose) strategic choice and resources that can be used for sustained competitive advantage or environmental elements gain (lose) efficacy, organizational "positions" within, and possibly between, choice situations will change. Thus, their "positions" within, and movement between, choice situations is importantly a function of their corporate or refocusing strategy.
Refocusing should be especially beneficial for firms in differentiated and incremental choice situations. For example, in differentiated choice situations, where firms have strategic choice and face strong external constraints, it would seem useful to refocus a diversified firm around a new or traditional core business with greater promise and less constraints. Such efforts would move the firm closer to a maximum choice situation. Refocusing would also generate additional slack from nonessential activities, thereby further increasing the strategic latitude of firms in differentiated choice situations. Such latitude would permit the redeployment of assets to improve competitive prospects in the newly defined core businesses (Bibeault, 1982; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) . It is important to note that nondiversified firms cannot refocus, thus their options may be limited to divestitures and reorganizations of various product lines (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Lubatkin et al., 2001 ). Indiscriminant divestiture without refocusing (i.e., the sale of profitable, but marketable core business assets), however, would only reduce the strategic choice of a firm in a differentiated choice situation, moving it closer to the even less favorable minimum choice setting. This would undoubtedly worsen the firm's post-bankruptcy performance prospects.
Similar predictions can be made for firms in incremental choice situations, but for different reasons. In incremental choice situations, where firms have limited slack and power, but ample latitude to maneuver in reasonably hospitable core industries, refocusing, where possible, would generate the cash flow and resources to increase strategic choice, thereby moving the bankrupt firm closer to the maximum choice setting with its associated rosier performance prospects. In this choice situation, however, the sale of assets without refocusing (i.e., simple asset reduction or downsizing) would increase slack, in some forms (unabsorbed), but decrease size and slack in others (absorbed). The net performance effect of such changes is probably zero, as it still leaves the firm in an incremental choice situation after bankruptcy protection. Therefore, firms in incremental choice situations that can refocus and choose to do so should have higher post-bankruptcy performance than other bankrupt firms in incremental choice situations.
Thus, the following within choice situation performance effects are hypothesized:
Hypothesis 6: Refocusing leads to higher post-bankruptcy performance for bankrupt firms in differentiated choice situations.
Hypothesis 7: Refocusing leads to higher post-bankruptcy performance for bankrupt firms in incremental choice situations.
Refocusing is also likely to have a positive effect on post-bankruptcy performance for firms in maximum choice situations. Maximum choice affords the bankrupt firm with a relatively more "target rich" environment than that of the other three quadrants. Accordingly, Marlin et al. (1994) found that firms operating under maximum choice situations had more degrees of freedom, which allowed product differentiation and operating in multiple niches. Still, it is unlikely that firms will emerge from bankruptcy without a major restructuring and reorientation of their businesses, operations, and management (Hotchkiss, 1995; Moulton & Thomas, 1993) . The relatively greater environmental carrying capacity of their contexts and the relatively greater slack resources of these firms may be important transformation shields (Baum, 1996) , thereby improving the odds of successful reorganization and transformation of the bankrupt firm. These transformational shields may buffer the bankrupt firm from stringent selection pressures, thereby permitting more degrees of freedom for error and opportunities for learning. Appropriately enacted refocusing in maximum choice situations should improve the bankrupt firm's power over its environment further, while improving or maintaining favorable niche characteristics for future performance. Therefore, these firms should be prime candidates to enact effective refocusing strategies. Thus, the following is hypothesized:
Hypothesis 8: Refocusing will lead to higher post-bankruptcy performance for bankrupt firms in maximum choice situations.
Bankrupt firms in minimum choice situations are in particularly dire straits. The absence of power and slack in a context of severe constraints and limited environmental carrying capacity makes it extremely unlikely that any amount of refocusing will provide the necessary changes to move these firms to a more favorable choice situation in a reasonable time frame. Bankrupt organizations operating in minimum choice situations have few resources with which to enact the strategic change necessary for a successful turnaround (Barker & Duhaime, 1997) ; and, if they had the resources, there are simply few opportunities to which they can be applied (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985) . Refocusing around a new core business may bring about the type of change that would be needed to move a bankrupt firm from a minimum choice situation to one of greater promise. Unfortunately, such a dramatic reorientation would also be fraught with all of the liabilities of newness associated with new organizations (Hannan & Freeman, 1977 . Additionally, these organizations would have little in the way of transformational shields to protect them from the onerous selection pressures facing bankrupt firms. Therefore, on balance, we expect refocusing to have little effect on post-bankruptcy performance for firms in this choice situation. Thus, it is hypothesized that:
Hypothesis 9: Refocusing will not lead to higher post-bankruptcy performance for bankrupt firms in minimum choice situations.
Methodology

Sample and Data Collection
The sample for this study consists of all publicly traded manufacturing firms (operating in SIC industries 2000-3999) having assets greater than US$ 10 million that filed for Chapter 11 reorganization between 1980 and 1992. These 207 firms were identified through the New Generation Research database of bankrupt firms. SIC industries 2000-3999 were chosen to aid data comparability. Publicly traded firms with assets greater than US$ 10 million were chosen for inclusion in the sample to increase the probabilities of finding sufficient data and having firms where refocusing is an option.
The time frame was chosen for two reasons. First, 1980 was selected as a starting year because it was the first full year in which the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 laws applied. Second, 1992 was selected as the ending year to allow all firms sufficient time to recover from bankruptcy. In keeping with prior research, it may take 2-5 years to assess the efficacy of reorganization and refocusing strategies (Bruton, Oviatt & White, 1994; Hotchkiss, 1995; Markides, 1995; Bergh, 1996) . Therefore, this study examined post-bankruptcy performance during 2-5 years following Chapter 11 filing.
All data were collected from secondary sources. Chapter 11-filing firms were identified through a database maintained by New Generation Research (Daily, 1996) . Refocusing, strategic choice, environmental constraint, and firm performance measures were identified through 1998 COMPUSTAT data tapes, annual reports, 10-k filings, and the Census of Manufactures.
Choice Situation Classifications
In order to test the hypotheses, a cluster analysis was used to classify firms into one of four choice quadrants. For each bankrupt firm, multiple measures were taken of both strategic choice and environmental constraint confronting them. The variables underlying the choice and environmental constraint constructs were selected using a deductive approach. That is, the variables comprising the constructs were chosen on a theoretical basis (Ketchen & Shook, 1996) . Strategic choice. Size, absorbed slack, and unabsorbed slack were used to assess strategic choice. Size was selected because greater size is believed to afford a firm with a greater range of strategic options, despite external forces (Baum, 1996; Marlin et al., 1994; Miles & Snow, 1978; Porter, 1980) . Organizational size (SIZE) is operationalized as the natural log of total assets, and is consistent with prior post-bankruptcy research (i.e., Daily & Dalton, 1995) . The slack measures were selected because slack has been theorized to be one the greatest tools for allowing strategic change in the face of organizational distress (Barker & Duhaime, 1997) . Absorbed slack (ASLACK) is operationalized as the sum of selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses and working capital, divided by total sales (Singh, 1986) . Unabsorbed slack (USLACK) is operationalized as the sum of cash and marketable securities, divided by current liabilities (Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 1986) . Thus, these three variables were chosen to represent strategic choice on a theoretical basis (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984) .
Environmental constraint. As mentioned earlier, because distressed firms are especially dependent on external resources for survival, the focus of the current study has been narrowed to examine environmental munificence or carrying capacity as the primary indicator of environmental constraint. Given the looming survival issues confronting bankrupt firms, this focus seemed appropriate. Further, the Marlin et al. (1994) study used comparative external resources (i.e., munificence) in the hospital market as its determinism construct for classifying firms' environmental constraints. Growth rates of the relevant industries, and for the economy in general, were used to assess environmental constraints and scarcity relevant to bankrupt firms. Consistent with recent research, industry growth was operationalized as the industry growth rate (by four digit SIC code) in the value of shipments for the 5-year post-bankruptcy period. This measure is similar to the munificence or carrying capacity measures used by Dess and Beard (1984) , Hambrick and D'Aveni (1988) , Staw and Szwajkowski (1975) . Industry growth rate (in sales or total shipments) is the one measure that is common among the aforementioned research. Therefore, in this study the industry growth rate in value of shipments (INDGROWTH) was used as one measure of constraint.
The value of shipments represents the total annual value of shipments of all establishments classified in a particular industry. This includes the shipments primary and secondary to the industry, as well as miscellaneous receipts including resales, sale of scrap, and repair work. This ratio variable was calculated as the growth rate in the value of shipments for each firm's primary four digit SIC code for the 5-year period being evaluated. The data necessary for this calculation was taken from the most current edition of the Census of Manufactures.
The general economy is also likely to affect post-bankruptcy performance. Over the last 20 years, there have been two recognized recessions (1981-1983 and 1989-1991) and one period of extraordinary growth (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) . The expansive or recessive nature of the economy determines the cost of capital and thus is likely to affect post-bankruptcy performance. Therefore, the general economic condition, reflected by gross national product (GNP) is calculated as the percentage GNP growth (standardized to 1980 dollars) from the year bankruptcy was filed to 5 years after bankruptcy was filed.
Principal components analysis was performed using the five classification variables identified above. As expected, principal components analysis revealed two factors with eigenvalues greater than one. The first factor (eigenvalue = 1.84) showed high loadings for size, absorbed, and unabsorbed slack (loadings = .58, .80, and .67 ) and the second factor (eigenvalue = 1.84) showed high loadings for industry growth and growth in GNP (loadings = .58 and .69). Therefore, these two factor scores became our measures of choice and constraint.
Cluster Analysis
Using the choice and constraint factor scores identified above, a two-stage cluster procedure was used. Consistent with theory, the hierarchical procedure using Ward's method identified four clusters as a feasible solution. The seed values were then used in the second k-means stage of the analysis. In the context of Hrebiniak and Joyce's (1985) framework, this process classified the organizations as 47 in incremental choice, 48 in maximum choice, 59 in differentiated choice, and 54 in minimum choice situations. The robustness of the cluster classifications was checked in a number of ways. Nonstandardized variables are reported here, although a separate analysis was also performed using standardized variables (Ketchen & Shook, 1996) . In general, the two solutions provided consistent cluster assignments. Average, median, and centroid clustering methods were also performed, and there were no meaningful differences in final cluster assignments. Next, an ANOVA was run to examine whether the clusters differed on the choice (F = 152.29, p < .001) and constraint (F = 80.71, p < .001) dimensions. Tukey comparisons were then performed to establish the dimensions on which the clusters differed. The results from the cluster analysis and Tukey comparisons are shown in Table 1 .
Measurement of the Variables
Post-bankruptcy performance. Consistent with prior turnaround research, we chose to measure post-bankruptcy performance using three criteria: 3-5 year averages of industryadjusted ROA, ROS (Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993; Ramanujam & Grant, 1989 ) and Altman's Z-score (Altman, 1993 ). Altman's Z-score uses specific weightings for five financial ratios to assess firm financial health and the likelihood that a firm will file (or refile) for bankruptcy protection. However, ROA, ROS, and the Altman's Z-score are likely to be correlated. Thus, these three performance measures were combined using principal components analysis. The items loaded neatly (loadings = .94, .86, and .73) on one factor (eigenvalue = 2.17). Additionally, the three items were internally consistent (α = .73). The factor scores were used as the dependent variable in our analyses.
Refocusing. Similar to research by Markides (1995) , entropy indexes for diversification were calculated over the relevant period for each firm in order to measure a firm's refocusing activity. The entropy measures of diversification (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979; Palepu, 1985) were calculated as follows:
where P i is the share of sales in segment i and ln(1/p i ) is the weight for each segment i. This operationalization seems appropriate in this study, because the entropy measure is typically highly correlated with the number of unrelated business units in a portfolio (Hoskisson, Hitt & Hill, 1993) . Levels of diversification were measured as the entropy measure for firm j at T 0-5 . Therefore, the degree of refocusing (REFOCUS) was calculated as the entropy measure at T 0 minus the respective entropy measure at T 5 .
Control variables. Two financial measures commonly used as control variables in bankruptcy research are earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) and leverage (LEV) (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1994a Flagg, Giroux & Wiggins, 1991; Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) . The use of pre-bankruptcy profitability and leverage as control variables allows for the examination of the effect of refocusing beyond these financial considerations. These data were determined from 1998 COMPUSTAT tapes. EBIT is an interval variables and is measured in the year bankruptcy is filed (e.g., Daily & Dalton, 1995) . LEV is a ratio variable operationalized as the total long-term debt (LTD) divided by the total equity (TE), also measured in the year bankruptcy is filed.
We controlled for differentiation strategy by using advertising (ADV) and research and development (R&D) intensity. These proxies are intended to capture competitive differences between the firms in our sample. This was considered important in light of the findings of Marlin et al. (1994) , documenting the importance of differentiation capabilities in affecting both the evolution of firm choice situations and the associated performance advantages. For each firm, we measured advertising intensity by computing the ratio of advertising expenses to sales, and then adjusted the ratio for industry effects by subtracting the industry-average advertising intensity. R&D intensity was calculated in the same manner, and both measures represent 2-year averages (the year before, and the year of bankruptcy filing).
We also controlled for firm age and initial level of diversity. Age and size effects are not always intertwined, and age may have a greater effect than size on a firm's propensity to change (Baum, 1996) . Age (AGE) was measured as the age of the firm at the time of bankruptcy. And, finally, since the level of refocusing that is possible for a firm depends on its level of diversification, we needed to control for the initial level of diversification for each firm at the time of their Chapter 11 filing. The T 0 entropy score (ENTROPY 0 ) was used for this purpose in our analyses.
Data Analyses
ANOVA was used to test the between quadrant performance differences predicted by Hypotheses 1-5. Hypotheses 6-9 posit significant interactions between choice situation and refocusing in predicting post-bankruptcy performance for three of the four choice situations. Analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was used to test Hypotheses 6-9 simultaneously. Testing all hypotheses using one model allowed us to attain the power necessary to test our null hypothesis (Hypothesis 9). 1
Results
Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2 . Consistent with expectations, the three strategic choice variables (SIZE, ASLACK, and USLACK) are positively correlated with all three measures of performance. Similarly, industry-specific growth (INDGROWTH) and the change in general economic conditions (GNP) variables are positively correlated with the three measures of performance. Therefore, the observed correlations fit the premises underlying this study. Dawley et al. / Journal of Management 2002 28(5) ANOVA was used to test Hypotheses 1-5. Results from the analyses are reported in Table 3 . The omnibus test for the ANOVA suggested performance differences among the four quadrants (F = 11.84, p < .001). Results indicated no significant difference between the post-bankruptcy performances of firms in maximum choice situations from those in differentiated choice situations. Thus, Hypothesis 1 was not supported. However, firms in maximum choice situations outperformed firms in incremental choice situations (mean difference = .90, p < .001). Additionally, firms in maximum choice situations outperformed firms in minimum choice situations (mean difference = .84, p < .01). Thus, support was found for both Hypotheses 2 and 3.
Support was also found for Hypothesis 4, that bankrupt firms in differentiated choice situations outperform firms in minimum choice situations (mean difference = .62, p < .01). However, the results did not support Hypothesis 5, that firms in incremental choice situations outperform firms in minimum choice situations. Overall, it appears that strategic choice was a more important determinant of post-bankruptcy performance between the theoretically and empirically distinguishable choice situations than was environmental constraint. Table 4 gives ANCOVA results for the effects of refocusing by choice situation on post-bankruptcy performance. Of the control variables, surprisingly, only advertising intensity was a significant predictor of post-bankruptcy performance, indicating that greater advertising intensity had a positive effect on post-bankruptcy performance. Choice situation (QUADRANT) and REFOCUS were both found as positive predictors of post-bankruptcy performance, in line with the ANOVA results in Table 3 and the popular prescription that bankrupt firms should refocus, respectively. The significant positive parameter estimates for the interaction terms in the ANCOVA model provide support for Hypotheses 6-8. The lack of significance for the MIN CHOICE × REFOCUS interaction term is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 9.
Discussion
The purpose of this study was to shed additional light on what factors affect post-bankruptcy performance of firms that have entered into Chapter 11 reorganization. We found that choice situation and refocusing strategy were two important factors. More favorable choice situations generally lead to higher post-bankruptcy performance. And corporate refocusing leads to higher post-bankruptcy performance in most, but not all, choice situations. That is, the performance effects of refocusing, a commonly recommended strategy for bankrupt firms, was found to be contingent on choice situation. These results usefully extend theory on choice situations and our understanding of when refocusing is an effective bankruptcy management strategy.
Somewhat surprisingly, we found mixed support for the predictive utility of choice situation as a determinant of post-bankruptcy performance. The results from this part of the study, testing Hypotheses 1-5, indicate that firms in high strategic choice situations outperform firms in low choice situations, regardless of environmental constraints. While this is still consistent with the general thrust of the theory guiding the study, in that more favorable choice situations should be associated with higher performance (Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1985) , it does suggest that, at least for bankrupt firms, having a high level of strategic choice is more important to subsequent performance than being located in a relatively munificent environment. This may be limited to bankrupt firms in that even the most hospitable of environments are still rather threatening and hostile. That is, the pressures and demands of other important stakeholders such as creditors may dwarf the carrying capacity of a firm's competitive context. Or, it may be that strategic choice is the more effective transformational shield for bankrupt firms. Given that Marlin et al. (1994) found similar results in their study of hospitals facing external pressures for transformation, the cumulative, albeit tentative, evidence suggests that strategic choice is more important than environmental constraint in shaping the success of firms facing major reorganization challenges. Regardless, it appears that accepted theory on choice situations and performance requires one or more caveats for bankrupt firms.
However, our findings offered good support for the contingent performance effects of corporate refocusing on post-bankruptcy performance. Consistent with Hypotheses 6 and 7, the results indicate that refocusing is especially beneficial for firms in differentiated and incremental choice situations, even though firms in incremental choice situations generally did not perform well after bankruptcy reorganization. Our suspicion that differentiated and incremental choice firms would refocus more intensely than maximum choice firms was confirmed by an ANOVA of refocusing intensity by quadrant. Incremental choice firms reduced their diversification levels significantly more than maximum choice firms 712 D.D. Dawley et al. / Journal of Management 2002 28(5) (p < .001), and differentiated choice firms reduced their diversification levels somewhat, but not significantly more than maximum choice firms (p = .21). These post hoc analyses lead us to believe that firms in maximum choice situations might exercise other types of turnaround strategies and undergo less refocusing activity than incremental and differentiated choice firms. This also suggests that refocusing, where feasible, is particularly critical in incremental choice situations. Refocusing in such situations increases a firm's level of strategic choice, moving it closer to a maximum choice situation, one particularly conducive to successful reorganizations. Consistent with Hypothesis 8, refocusing was also effective in improving post-bankruptcy performance in maximum choice situations when bankrupt firms enjoy the benefits of greater relative choice and munificence. Additionally, results indicate that refocusing did not lead to higher post-bankruptcy performance for firms in minimum choice situations. No amount of refocusing appears to help firms in minimum choice situations. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 9.
In order to determine if the performance of firms in the minimum choice quadrant was initially lower than the performance of those firms in the other quadrants, we ran an ANOVA to compare average quadrant pre-bankruptcy performance EBITs. There were significant differences between group means, but the Tukey post hoc tests showed that incremental choice firms were initially worse off. Specifically, pre-bankruptcy EBIT means in incremental choice firms were significantly lower than differentiated choice firms (p = .009), maximum choice firms (p = .008), and minimum choice firms (p = .021). No other post hoc comparisons showed significant differences. Thus the post hoc comparisons, the inclusion of EBIT as a control, and the finding that incremental choice firms improve their post-bankruptcy performance despite lower pre-bankruptcy performance, together suggest that it is the interaction of choice situation and refocusing that matter, not the firms' initial performance levels.
Our study contributes to the ongoing dialogue between strategy theorists and organizational ecologists on the interplay of strategic choice and environmental constraints in explaining organizational change and adaptation, albeit in a special context: bankrupt firms. Where prior research documents the importance of the effects of both strategic choice and environmental carrying capacity on firm performance and survival (e.g., Barnett & Hansen, 1996; Baum, 1996; Marlin et al., 1994) , our study indicates that strategic choice may be the more important factor when explaining reorganization success from bankruptcy. Bankruptcy reorganizations generally require significant organizational changes in strategy, structure, management, and processes at multiple hierarchical levels and, generally, simultaneously (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) . This is a daunting task, which probably explains why so few succeed (Hotchkiss, 1995; Moulton & Thomas, 1993) . In this unique context of transformation under time pressure and with limited resources, however, it appears that those firms with relatively greater strategic choice are better able to successfully negotiate the required transformation. In ecological terms, it appears that size and slack serve as important transformational shields (Baum, 1996) for bankrupt firms. This is not to say that environmental carrying capacity is not important for bankrupt firms. We found that firms in incremental choice situations, those with little choice and good environmental carrying capacity, could achieve post-bankruptcy performance gains if they were able to refocus their business portfolios. So, the role of environmental carrying capacity played in affecting post-bankruptcy performance was found to be a more complex function of strategy and choice interactions than prior theory suggested. Regardless, the unique contribution of environmental carrying capacity in explaining post-bankruptcy performance was far less than that of strategic choice for our bankrupt firms. This seems to also be true for other types of distressed organizations (Marlin et al., 1994) . If confirmed in future research, this could be an important boundary condition for theory on choice situations and performance.
Our findings also extend bankruptcy research. Prior to the current study, researchers had begun to identify predictors of post-bankruptcy performance. Some factors included the effects of board composition (Daily & Dalton, 1995) and executive turnover (Hotchkiss, 1995) . Implicit in this literature is that management changes lead to some types of strategic changes, which then affect post-bankruptcy performance. Going beyond previous work, we therefore, begin to get more directly at the determinants of post-bankruptcy performance in this study by isolating one prominent type of change used by bankrupt firms, refocusing, and identifying choice situations where it is and is not likely to be useful. What's more, the significance of advertising intensity, one proxy for differentiation or market power, as a predictor of post-bankruptcy performance found in this research suggests that strategic initiatives that bolster differentiation advantages and market power may warrant additional research attention as a form of strategic change in future bankruptcy research.
The results also help clarify the utility of a popular turnaround strategy, refocusing, albeit in a rather extreme context, bankrupt firms, thereby informing the more general turnaround literature as well. Strategic refocusing, as opposed to more simple asset or cost reduction strategies, has long been recommended by turnaround strategy researchers (Barker & Duhaime, 1997; Bibeault, 1982; Hambrick & Schecter, 1983; Pearce & Robbins, 1993) as the preferred option in successful turnarounds. Although bankruptcy is a pretty extreme case for turnaround, and probably not a likely occurrence (Hambrick & D'Aveni, 1988) , we document the particular utility of strategic focusing in incremental, differentiated, and maximum choice situations. It may be useful for future research on turnarounds to further consider the context of business turnarounds in terms of choice and environmental constraint. This should help to further delineate the situations where various turnaround strategies are more or less successful.
The findings discussed above also have implications for stakeholders and managers of distressed firms that are considering entering into Chapter 11 bankruptcy. From a stakeholder perspective, and as unappealing as it may be to managers, our results suggest that one prudent action for distressed firms in minimum choice situations would be liquidation as opposed to entering Chapter 11 reorganization. This is because a firm facing this type of choice situation has little chance of surviving no matter what strategic actions are taken by management. Regardless, the more conventional prescriptions of refocusing, at least, appear to offer little hope. More creative reorganization plans appear warranted. Our results also rather clearly indicate that firms in high strategic choice situations are the best candidates for Chapter 11 reorganization, since they stand a better chance of surviving than do firms in low choice situations. What's more, our results suggest that refocusing has a positive effect on post-bankruptcy performance for firms in maximum and differentiated choice situations, and a particularly positive effect for firms in incremental choice situations, where performance improvement is generally not likely.
As with any study, this study has certain limitations, beyond those already noted, that limit the generalizability of the results, but also provide opportunities for future research. Dawley et al. / Journal of Management 2002 28(5) One limitation of this study has to do with the possibility of selection bias associated with the sample. Due to the lack of data availability, a sample including privately held, nonmanufacturing, and/or smaller (<US$ 10 million in total assets) firms was not feasible to collect, even though these types of firms might provide data with characteristics different from that obtained for this study. In addition, future research efforts may want to examine a longer time frame than the one examined in the current study (i.e., the current study examined [1980] [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] . For example, increasing the time frame of the study would build on the current study in two ways. First, a longer time frame would document the temporal stability of our findings. Second, extending the research to include firms before the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 would provide pre-and post-Act data that could be used to analyze the effectiveness of this legislative action.
In sum, the goal of this study was to take a logical step in the examination of the determinants of post-bankruptcy performance. Toward this end, we took the position that bankruptcies can be viewed as an extreme form of turnaround requiring major organizational transformation, one form of which could be described as refocusing. We also suggested that it is useful to view these refocusing initiatives of bankrupt firms as occurring in different choice situations that help explain both the logic underlying their transformations and the likelihood of their success. Our results generally supported these contentions and suggest important avenues for future research on bankruptcy reorganizations, turnarounds, and choice situation/performance relationships. We can only hope that this work proves to play a useful part in the cumulative dialogue between strategy and organizational ecology theorists about the dynamics and outcomes of organization, strategy and environment interactions.
Note
1. See Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin (1998) for an in-depth discussion of sample size requirements for null hypothesis testing. According to power tables and GPOWER2I, a shareware program for determining statistical power, a sample size of 197 was necessary to achieve power of .95. Since our sample size was 207, our power level was .97. Given this power level, "the conclusion is justified that no nontrivial effects exist at the B = .05 level" (Cohen, 1990 (Cohen, :1309 .
